01917nas a2200229   4500008004100000022001400041245010800055210006900163260004200232300000900274490000600283520118900289653003201478653002901510653001801539653002401557653001901581653001501600100001901615700001701634856003601651       2015                        eng d  a1927-032100aA Design Science Approach to Constructing Critical Infrastructure and Communicating Cybersecurity Risks0 aDesign Science Approach to Constructing Critical Infrastructure   aOttawabTalent First Networkc06/2015  a6-160 v53 aAcademics are increasingly examining the approaches individuals and organizations use to construct critical infrastructure and communicate cybersecurity risks. Recent studies conclude that owners and operators of critical infrastructures, as well as governments, do not disclose reliable information related to cybersecurity risks and that cybersecurity specialists manipulate cognitive limitations to overdramatize and oversimplify cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructures. This article applies a design science perspective to the challenge of securing critical infrastructure by developing a process anchored around evidence-based design principles. The proposed process is expected to enable learning across critical infrastructures, improve the way risks to critical infrastructure are communicated, and improve the quality of the responses to citizens’ demands for their governments to collect, validate, and disseminate reliable information on cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructures. These results will be of interest to the general public, vulnerable populations, owners and operators of critical infrastructures, and various levels of governments worldwide. 10aadvanced persistent threats10acritical infrastructures10acybersecurity10adesign propositions10adesign science10aresilience1 aMuegge, Steven1 aCraigen, Dan  uhttp://timreview.ca/article/90200801nas a2200265   4500008004100000022001400041245007000055210006700125260004200192300000800234490000600242653001100248653001600259653002800275653001800303653002200321653001900343653001500362653003000377653003800407100001800445700001700463700001900480856003600499       2015                        eng d  a1927-032100aEditorial: Critical Infrastructures and Cybersecurity (June 2015)0 aEditorial Critical Infrastructures and Cybersecurity June 2015  aOttawabTalent First Networkc06/2015  a3-50 v510abotnet10aclub theory10acritical infrastructure10acybersecurity10adesign principles10adesign science10ahealthcare10anetworked medical devices10aproject management maturity model1 aMcPhee, Chris1 aCraigen, Dan1 aMuegge, Steven  uhttp://timreview.ca/article/90102761nas a2200289   4500008004100000022001400041245012200055210006900177260004200246300001000288490000600298520190700304653000902211653003102220653001302251653002902264653001802293653000902311653000902320653000902329653002302338100001702361700001902378700001902397700001902416856003602435       2015                        eng d  a1927-032100aSecure by Design: Cybersecurity Extensions to Project Management Maturity Models for Critical Infrastructure Projects0 aSecure by Design Cybersecurity Extensions to Project Management   aOttawabTalent First Networkc06/2015  a26-340 v53 aMany systems that comprise our critical infrastructures – including electricity, transportation, healthcare, and financial systems – are designed and deployed as information technology (IT) projects using project management practices. IT projects provide a one-time opportunity to securely "design in" cybersecurity to the IT components of critical infrastructures. The project management maturity models used by organizations today to assess the quality and rigour of IT project management practices do not explicitly consider cybersecurity. This article makes three contributions to address this gap. First, it develops the argument that cybersecurity can and should be a concern of IT project managers and assessed in the same way as other project management capabilities. Second, it examines three widely used cybersecurity maturity models – i) the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) framework for improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity, ii) the United States Department of Energy’s Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2), and iii) the CERT Resilience Management Model (CERT RMM) from the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute – to identify six cybersecurity themes that are salient to IT project management. Third, it proposes a set of cybersecurity extensions to PjM3, a widely-deployed project management maturity model. The extensions take the form of a five-level cybersecurity capability perspective that augments the seven standard perspectives of the PjM3 by explicitly assessing project management capabilities that impact the six themes where IT project management and cybersecurity intersect. This article will be relevant to IT project managers, the top management teams of organizations that design and deploy IT systems for critical infrastructures, and managers at organizations that provide and maintain critical infrastructures.10aC2M210acapability maturity models10aCERT RMM10acritical infrastructures10acybersecurity10aNIST10aP3M310aPjM310aproject management1 aPayette, Jay1 aAnegbe, Esther1 aCaceres, Erika1 aMuegge, Steven  uhttp://timreview.ca/article/90402627nas a2200241   4500008004100000022001400041245006100055210006100116260004200177300001000219490000600229520192000235653002402155653003002179653002202209653001802231653001402249653001902263653003202282100001602314700001902330856003602349       2013                        eng d  a1927-032100aKeystone Business Models for Network Security Processors0 aKeystone Business Models for Network Security Processors  aOttawabTalent First Networkc07/2013  a25-330 v33 aNetwork security processors are critical components of high-performance systems built for cybersecurity. Development of a network security processor requires multi-domain experience in semiconductors and complex software security applications, and multiple iterations of both software and hardware implementations. Limited by the business models in use today, such an arduous task can be undertaken only by large incumbent companies and government organizations. Neither the “fabless semiconductor” models nor the silicon intellectual-property licensing (“IP-licensing”) models allow small technology companies to successfully compete. This article describes an alternative approach that produces an ongoing stream of novel network security processors for niche markets through continuous innovation by both large and small companies. This approach, referred to here as the "business ecosystem model for network security processors", includes a flexible and reconfigurable technology platform, a “keystone” business model for the company that maintains the platform architecture, and an extended ecosystem of companies that both contribute and share in the value created by innovation. New opportunities for business model innovation by participating companies are made possible by the ecosystem model. This ecosystem model builds on: i) the lessons learned from the experience of the first author as a senior integrated circuit architect for providers of public-key cryptography solutions and as the owner of a semiconductor startup, and ii) the latest scholarly research on technology entrepreneurship, business models, platforms, and business ecosystems. This article will be of interest to all technology entrepreneurs, but it will be of particular interest to owners of small companies that provide security solutions and to specialized security professionals seeking to launch their own companies.10abusiness ecosystems10abusiness model innovation10acommercialization10acybersecurity10aplatforms10asemiconductors10atechnology entrepreneurship1 aLow, Arthur1 aMuegge, Steven  uhttp://timreview.ca/article/703